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ABSTRACT
A recent reform in Florida's juvenile detention criteria was
over-turned during the subsequent legislative session. This
paper describes both the initial reform and its reversal and
suggests that symbolic political rewards may often be more
important than the actual consequences of a policy.
Recommendations are made for accomplishing policy reform in a
traditional political culture.
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970's, a child entering the juvenile justice system
in Florida was more likely to be placed in secure detention than
a child in any other state (Florida Center for Children & Youth,
1980). By 1980, "reform" legislation had been passed which
reduced the number of admissions by twenty-one per cent and
decreased the average daily population by twenty-six per cent.
Only a year later, however, new "tougher" legislation had been
passed which led to an ultimate increase in secure detentions of
forty-seven per cent and to a growth of thirty-nine per cent in
the detention population (Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services, 1982). This article provides a case history
of these two important changes in Florida's juvenile justice
legislation which were accomplished within the short space of a
year. This case illustrates some of the problems which confront
liberal, reform-minded coalitions when they oppose the power of
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local politicians and political organizations within the context
of a state legislature.
Juvenile Detention
Detention is roughly analagous to jail in the adult cri-
minal justice system, inasmuch as it provides custody for
juveniles accused of committing delinquent acts. It is dif-
ferent from jail in that detention in most jurisdictions cannot
legally be used for the punishment of children who already have
been adjudicated as delinquent by the court, while adults with
short sentences are frequently incarcerated in jail (Sarri,1974).
Detention is not intended as a punishment for children
since, like adults, they are presumed innocent at the pre-trial
stage. Until the turn of the century, children who were deemed
criminally responsible for illegal acts were also tried and
punished much the same as adults. With the creation of juvenile
courts and the further specialization of legal codes regarding
juvenile behavior, a separate system for trying and treating
juvenile offenders gradually developed (Platt,1977). Not until
the Kent decision in 1966 did our legal system recognize some
responsibility for the protection of the rights of children
under the juvenile justice system (Kent vs United States 383 U.S.
541 [1966]). Over the next few years, further court decisions,
state and federal laws, and administrative practice further
defined the function of juvenile detention so that ideally
juvenile offenders: 1) could expect much the same protection of
their legal rights during detention as adults, 2) were subject to
pre-trial detention only in very limited conditions (Anbry, 1971),
and 3) were separated from adult offenders. Those children
accused of status offenses, i.e., behaviors not defined as
criminal activity for adults, are also entitled to separate
facilities from those children accused of criminal offenses (42
U.S.C. 5633).
Detention in Florida
These legal and humanitarian ideals regarding detention were
rarely met anywhere in the nation, and they were certainly not
reached in Florida. An LEAA-funded study of children in adult
jails in Florida by a private research/advocacy organization,
the Florida Center for Children and Youth, disclosed that one of
the state's major problems was that half of the jails violated
minimum federal standards for juvenile detention, and 95% of the
adult jails used violated minimum state standards for use as
juvenile facilities (1979). Among the problems encountered in
these substandard facilities were overcrowding, sexual abuse,
lack of supervision, and suicide ("Faulty Jails", 1980).
Florida also operated twenty regional, maximum-security juvenile
detention facilities with a combined capacity of more than 1,000
youths.
Previous Research on Juvenile Detention
In one of the most comprehensive studies of juvenile de-
tention in the United States, Sarri documented widespread pro-
blems in the administration of laws regarding detention, as well
as the importance of situational or structural factors in the
detention decision (1974). For example, the time and location
of the apprehension and the location of the detention facility
were at least as important as the severity of the offense. A
later study by Kramer and Steffensmier supported the importance
of these factors, in addition to discovering that juvenile status
offenders were more likely to be detained than were juveniles
accused of criminal behavior (1978). (Status offenders are also
just as likely to be incarcerated as juvenile delinquents (McNeece,
1980)).
Other research at the National Assessment of Juvenile
Corrections concluded that juvenile offenders who were detained
were less likely to have their legal rights protected by the
court or by the public defenders than were juveniles who were not
detained (McNeece, 1976). Kihm found in a later study of deten-
tion criteria that the re-arrest rates and failure-to-appear
rates for juveniles who were released pending adjudication were
not significantly different from the rates for detainees (1980).
This finding erodes one of the major reasons for the use of
detention --insuring that the offender is present for an adjudi-
cation hearing and that he or she is not involved in subsequent
delinquent activity prior to adjudication. Unfortunately, as we
shall see in the following pages, most Florida lawmakers did not
choose to utilize this information in the development of new
juvenile justice policies.
REFORM, 1980
The Background for Reform
Prior to the 1980 changes in the juvenile detention law,
Florida statutes had provided five criteria for detention place-
ment. They were:
(a) To protect the person or property of others or of the
child;
(b) Because the child has no parent, guardian, responsible
-244-
relative, or other adult approved by the court, able
to provide supervision and care for him. If a child
is to be detained pursuant to this paragraph alone,
a crisis home only may be used;
(c) To secure his presence at the next hearing;
(d) Because the child has been twice previously adjud-
icated to have committed a delinquent act and has been
charged with a third subsequent delinquent act which
would constitute a felony if the child were an adult;
or
(e) To hold for another jurisdiction a delinquent, child
escapee or an absconder from probation, community
control program or parole supervision or for a child
who is wanted by another jurisdiction for an offense
which, if committed by an adult, would be a violation
of law (Chapter 39.032, Florida Statutes).
These criteria were originally intended to limit the use of
detention to children who might pose a threat to the community or
to themselves, or who were not likely to appear for an adju-
dication hearing if released. The criteria, vaguely worded and
subject to broad interpretation by intake workers and courts
alike, led to the inappropriate use of detention. A report from
the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(DHRS) in 1978 showed that 371 abused or neglected children and
754 status offenders had been housed in secure detention during
the first half of that year, contrary to both Florida law and
federal standards (1979a). During this same time, several of the
regional detention facilities were under court orders to reduce
their populations because of overcrowded and unsafe conditions.
This situation lent an air or urgency to the need for reform.
The next year another HRS study reviewed the decisions of
intake workers to place children in detention. In one of the ten
HRS regions studied, the monitors disagreed with 61% of the
decisions to detain. Another study reported that 38% of the
detained children in Daytona Beach were questionably, inappro-
priately, or illegally placed (DHRS, 1979b). The latter report
resulted in a class action suit against local detention officials
(H.C. vs. Jarrad, et. al., N.D. FL. TCA-79-0830).
Building a Reform Coalition
During 1978-79, the Florida Center for Children and Youth
assisted citizens groups in five communities in monitoring the
processing of children in their regional detention centers. In
all of the five sites, a large proportion of the children
processed were accused of minor offenses such as curfew vio-
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lations, truancy, liquor possession, etc. A substantial number
of the children detained were status offenders, children who had
committed no criminal acts. In Broward County (Ft. Lauderdale)
the Human Rights Advocacy Committee found that 30% of the cases
they reviewed represented children who were placed in detention
contrary to HRS policy or state law. This overuse of detention
was costly in both human and economic terms. In addition to the
restrictions on individual liberties, detention was estimated to
cost $35.00 per day per youth (FCCY, 1980).
At the same time, the Florida Chapter of the National
Association of Social Workers (NASW), the Florida Association for
Human Services (FAHS), and the League of Women Voters were also
active in generating support to revise the detention criteria
during the 1980 legislative session. NASW was particularly
active in contacting legislators and soliciting their support for
adopting the detention standards developed in 1976 by the
Committee on Standards for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, a committee of the National Advisory Committee on Ju-
venile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (U.S. Department of
Justice).
All three of the major participating organizations in the
drive to reform the state's detention criteria - - the Florida
Center for Children and Youth, the Florida Association for Human
Services, and the National Association of Social Workers - - had
a long history of involvement in policy development in Florida,
and they were generally well-regarded by members of the legisla-
ture.
Meanwhile, the FCCY report on the status of children in
adult jails in Florida (page above) was timed for release at the
opening of the 1980 legislative session. FCCY recommended that
the best way to solve the various problems associated with the
placement of children in jails was to make room for them in the
Juvenile detention centers. This could be easily accomplished,
according to FCCY, by implementing specific, offense-based cri-
teria for the use of secure detention. There was broad legisla-
tive interest in these issues and some support for the specific
proposals. Senator Dunn, a long-time advocate for improved
juvenile justice, agreed to add language to a bill he had al-
ready filed that would severely restrict the conditions under
which a juvenile could be placed in any detention facility. (The
bill which finally passed and was signed by the governor also
contained several provisions which did not relate to detention,
but the main thrust of that bill was detention.)
Unfortunately for the advocates of the new detention cri-
teria, Senator Dunn was having difficulty getting any of his
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legislation to the floor of the Senate because of some changes in
the Senate power structure. Senator Beard, however, had proposed
a non-controversial bill at the request of the Florida Sheriff's
Association, SB409, that would clear up vague and confusing
language relating to juvenile placements in adult jails. When
SB409 reached the floor of the Senate, Senator Beard, a former
sheriff himself, agreed to let Senator Dunn amend his bill onto
SB409. The new detention standards allowed detention in cases in
which:
(a) The child is from another jurisdiction and is an
escapee, (sic) from a commitment program or absconder
from probation, a community control program or parole
supervision, for an offense which, if committed by an
adult, would be a violation of law, or the child is
wanted by another jurisdiction for an offense which, if
committed by an adult, would be a violation of law;
(b) The child requests protection in circumstances that
appear to present an immediate threat to his per-
sonal safety.
(c) The child is charged with a capital felony, life
felony, or felony of the first degree; or a crime of
violence, i.e., murder in the third degree, man-
slaughter, sexual battery, robbery, aggravated
assault; or with two or more serious property
crimes arising out of separate transactions;
(d) The child is charged with a serious property
crime; i.e., arson or burglary as defined in
s. 810.02(2) and (3); or with the sale or
manufacture of or trafficking in a controlled
substance; which if committed by an adult
would be a felony, and:
1. He is already detained or has been released
and is awaiting final dispositions of his
case; or
2. He has a record of failure to appear at court
hearings; or
3. He has a record of violent conduct resulting
in physical injury to others; or
4. He has a record of adjudications for serious
property offenses (Chapter 39.032, Florida
Statutes).
With little opposition from organized law enforcement, the
courts, or the press, the new standards were passed during the
1980 legislative session and went into effect July 1, 1980.
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OUTCOME OF THE REFORM
Public Reaction
Soon after the implementation of the new standards, strong
objections were being raised across the state by almost every
part of the juvenile justice system - - judges, law enforcement
officers, state prosecuting attorneys, and intake workers. The
state's newspapers were almost universally critical of the new
standards. The reason for this outcry had nothing to do with the
performance of the criteria, for the changes passed by the 1980
legislature had accomplished just what was intended - a reduction
in the general use of detention. More important, the average
detention population and detention admissions had been greatly
reduced (page 1, above) without any increase in the re-arrest
rate or the failure-to-appear rate (DHRS, 1981).
Obviously, detention had been used in the past not just as a
way of protecting the community or guaranteeing the appearance of
the accused juvenile at adjudication hearings, even though those
were the only legitimate ends recognized in the statutes. The old
standards had allowed for a type of symbolic punishment which
seemed to be lacking in the new standards. Under the new
criteria, many critics felt that a number of offenses were not
included among those violations which warranted detention. Among
those were drug possession, grand theft, and possession of stolen
property. Under the new legislation children accused of those
crimes would now have their day in court before being punished
-- much the same as in the adult justice system. Sanctions
could then be meted out only after a proper adjudication.
All adults accused of crimes in Florida have a right to bail
except when charged with crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment. In fact, most sheriffs in the state operate
"release on recognizance" programs which allow the release of an
adult without bail pending his or her trial. We know that a
small percentage of those adults released on bail or on their own
recognizance will either commit subsequent crimes or will fail to
appear for trial. The public may not be happy with this
situation but it is at least tolerated. When the new juvenile
detention standards were implemented and similar rights of
pre-trial release were granted to children, there was an
immediate widespread protest. One newspaper after another
printed stories with headlines such as these:
"Juvenile Justice System Aids Young Killers"
Florida Flambeau, April 16, 1981
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"Juveniles' Antics Frustrate Police"
Tampa Tribune, March 28, 1981
"New Law Helps Teenage Thugs as Victims Lose"
Miami Herald, October 24, 1980
The criticism of the new standards in each of these stories
focused on the inability of local officials to detain most ju-
veniles accused of a crime between apprehension and adjudica-
tion. In most of the stories, there were implicit assumptions
that such juveniles were guilty, would commit subsequent crimes
and would have a low rate of appearance for adjudication hear-
ings. In the relatively few instances where these behaviors did
occur, newspapers published graphic illustrations of the crimes
committed, thus lending support to the public's opinion of the
unsoundness of the new law.
Judges, State Attorneys and Law Enforcement Reactions
Law enforcement officials responded by "discovering" a
rising crime rate and blaming it on the inability to detain most
juvenile offenders. They publicly lamented the fact that under
the new detention criteria, "the juvenile offender is back on the
street before the victim is out of the hospital." In some cases,
police hinted that they were not pursuing juvenile arrests as
vigorously as before because of the futility of prosecuting
juveniles under the new code. The Police Chief's Association
issued a statement calling for an amendment to the criteria which
would allow more discretion in decision-making regarding
detention. Their statement also indicated a desire for strong
input from police officials in detention decisions, a factor
which they felt was lacking in the new standards (DHRS, 1981).
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association viewed the new de-
tention criteria as too restrictive, and they believed that too
many accused juveniles were being released after apprehension
when they actually should have been held in detention. They
recommended an expansion of the detention criteria, and they even
went so far as to recommend that adult jails once again be used
for juvenile detention (DURS, 1981).
Judges were perhaps the most vocal of all local officials in
their opposition to the new criteria. Although it was seldom
expressed, one obvious reason for their dissatisfaction was that
the new criteria virtually eliminated the exercise of judicial
discretion regarding detention. Six of the twenty judicial
circuits went so far as to issue court orders broadening the
detention criteria and allowing a broader category of juvenile
offenders to be detained. As a result, almost a third of the
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juveniles detained during the last nine months of 1980 were
detained by court order (DHRS, 1981). One local judge issued an
advisory opinion (involving no litigants) stating that:
"The legislature did not intend that children
(some of which are thugs) when caught in the
act of a serious crime such as burglary .....
threatening children, scaring old people .....
BE TURNED LOOSE ON THE SPOT AND NOT BE DETAINED
IN THE JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER ............
It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that any
language in the new Act .... conflicting with
the language authorizing the jailing of a
juvenile thug .... is hereby declared uncon-
stitutional..." (Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
80-10 CCJ, 1980).
Although this opinion was quickly invalidated by a state ap-
pellate court, it represented a strong and widely held attitude
among Florida judges.
Impact of the New Criteria
It should be restated at this point that the actual impact
of the new detention criteria on the major problems of over-
crowding and inappropriate use of detention was quite positive.
As described earlier, the detention population was reduced and
the number of admissions was substantially decreased. This
allowed the State time and resources to comply with various court
orders regarding overcrowding. Abuse and suicide rates also
dropped among the detained juveniles. At the same time, there
were noted no significant differences in the rates of re-arrest
or failure-to-appear for hearings among those juveniles who were
now being released compared to those previously detained (DHRS,
1981). Opponents of the new criteria did not want to be bothered
with these facts, however. The important change which had
aroused their ire was that the punitive value of detention -- at
the discretion of local officials -- had been diminished.
BACKLASH, 1981
The Law and Order Coalition
The stage had been set for a nullification of the 1980 re-
form bill by the opening of the next legislative session. All of
those groups which had expressed stong criticism of the 1980
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changes had sought out support in both houses of the legisla-
ture, and potential sponsors for a new "tough" bill which broad-
ened detention criteria were in plentiful supply. Senator Beard,
perhaps hoping to make amends to his constituents for
inadvertently sponsoring the 1980 legislation, quickly filed such
a bill. (The bill was written by Beard with considerable input
from Judge Spicola from his district. Spicola had served as a
Senator until his appointment to the bench. Beard was then
appointed to fill Spicola's vacant Senate seat.)
The Reform Coalition
The same liberal forces which supported the 1980 changes
once again coalesced and planned to fight any subsequent change
to broaden the detention criteria (or any other change which
would make the state's juvenile justice system more punitive.)
NASW and FCCY were especially active in coordinating lobbying
efforts and organizing expert witnesses to speak against pro-
posed changes in committee hearings.
The New Juvenile Code Proposal
The new bill, HB1095, not only sought to broaden detention
criteria, but it also included several other "punitive" features
which NASW and FCCY viewed as a backlash from the forces of
law-and-order conservatism. It also included changes regarding:
1) the processing of juvenile traffic offenders, 2) the placement
of juveniles in jail as a sentencing alternative, 3) the
judicial determination of post-disposition treatment plans, 4)
parental restitution requirements, 5) the publication of names
of alleged juvenile offenders, and 6) provisions for processing
16-or-17-year-old juveniles in adult courts at the discretion of
the state attorney. This was one of fifteen "get tough"
juvenile bills filed in the 1981 legislature ("Juvenile Justice",
1981).
The 1981 Legislative Process
HB1095 was developed by the House Select Committee on Ju-
venile Justice, a newly created committee, which was heavily
weighted with law-and-order advocates. (Normally such a bill
would have been referred to the Committee on Health and Reha-
bilitative Services a relatively friendly committee.) The senate
counterpart was referred to the Senate Judiciary-Criminal Justice
Committee, a committee not ordinarily given jurisdiction over
juvenile justice legislation.
During the hearings most of the committee members spoke of
the "many concerns" expressed by their constituents regarding the
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lax treatment of juvenile offenders. The Chair of the Senate
committee stated that:
"I've gotten more letters on this subject than
anything since I've been here. People are afraid
of children. There's a certain rationality with
an adult (criminal), but not with a child" ("Juvenile
Justice", 1981)
Senator Beard and other members of the Senate Committee
arranged for a carefully selected group of "victims" to testify
at committee hearings regarding the harm which had personally
befallen them because of the 1980 revisions in the detention
criteria ("Who Protects Us", 1981). Opponents of HB1095 attended
these hearings, but most of those persons wishing to speak
against the bill were never called. Most of the time for taking
testimony was devoted to advocates of the bill. (Note: Both
authors were in attendance at the Senate committee meeting,
wishing to speak against the bill.)
Opponents of the bill planned to make one last attempt to
modify some of its more punitive aspects at an expected House-
Senate Conference Committee meeting, but several prior "secret"
meetings took place between the major participants and their
staff in order to avoid bargaining and decision-making in ano-
ther highly-charged public meeting. A secret compromise was
reached and no joint conference committee was named. Only one
punitive feature of the final bill was totally eliminated before
passage, the section which specifically allowed courts to use
detention as a sentencing alternative. The Senate had passed the
bill by a 30 to 1 vote, and the House version passed by a 113 to
10 margin ("Get-Tough Juvenile Bill", 1981). It was obviously a
very popular piece of legislation.
Opponents also attempted to influence the governor to veto
HB1095, some pointing only to the state's regression to an
earlier, more punitive use of detention, others citing the cer-
tainty of additional expenses accruing from an anticipated growth
of detention. Nevertheless, the governor had already publicly
voiced his support for "tougher" juvenile laws, and he signed the
bill without hesitation.
CONCLUSIONS
Impact of the 1981 Changes
Just as the opponents of HB1095 had expected, the broader
detention criteria implemented in July, 1981 resulted in in-
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creased use of detention. During the first six months, the new
criteria resulted in: 1) a 47% increase in admissions to secure
detention, 2) a 62% increase in the average daily population in
non-secure detention, and 3) a dramatic increase in the
proportion of youth screened and detained. Once again there was
no significant change in the non-appearance or re-arrest rate
(DHRS, 1982). Those rates did not increase with the 1980 reform,
nor did they improve with the 1981 broadened detention criteria.
Those behaviors are apparently not related to the matter of
detention.
Politics and Symbolism in Juvenile Justice
Perhaps more important to the law-and-order groups lobbying
for the 1981 changes, and perhaps even to the public at large,
was the restoration of the symbolic function of punishment
through pre-trial detention. It has been pointed out quite
clearly in the context of other political issues that the
symbolic rewards which emanate from political action are fre-
quently more important than any tangible results (Edelman, 1964).
The 1980 reform was pushed through the legislature by a
liberal-minded coalition of social workers and youth advocates at
a time when the "law-and-order" forces were paying little
attention. In fact, some of the more conservative members of the
legislature had supported the 1980 changes because they in-
correctly perceived SB409 only as a way of separating adult and
juvenile offenders, reducing overcrowding, thus removing the
threat of various lawsuits and the threat of a loss of federal
funding for juvenile programs.
When they learned of the limitations in the power of local
officials to use the symbolic function of pre-trial detention,
there was a groundswell of opposition. Organizations of judges,
law enforcement officials, state prosecuting attorneys, and
others coordinated grass-roots lobbying efforts to negate the
reform only one year later. The use of detention as a symbol of
the local court and police ability to protect the community from
the threat of juvenile crime was a function overlooked by the
liberal reform groups. It made no difference that juvenile crime
had not increased with the 1980 reform (Florida Department of
Law Enforcement, 1981), or that re-arrests and non-appearance
did not significantly change. What mattered was the missing
symbol of the power of state and local authorities to immediately
punish accused juveniles, thus ritualistically reinforcing
community norms against delinquent behavior and giving the
impression of protecting the community against subsequent delin-
quent behavior.
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Regional Differences in Political Symbolism
Most scholars of public social policy agree that it is much
easier to achieve agreement on programs than on objectives, and
that when agreement on values underlying programs is necessary,
policy compromise is more difficult to reach (Banfield, 1961;
Gil, 1976; Wildavsky, 1979; Dluhy, 1981). The basic prob-
lem is that agreement on a particular policy is more difficult
to achieve whenever there are value conflicts among the parti-
cipants in the policy process. "Liberal" reform efforts are
likely to lead to such value conflicts under certain fairly
predictable conditions. For example, issues that touch on such
matters as the treatment of criminals (or delinquents), gay
rights, and abortion, provide more potential for conflict on
the basis of values than do highway construction or teacher
education requirements.
Another important factor is the geographic context of the
policy development process. Elazar has thoroughly described the
geographic distribution of political cultures in the settlement
of America, and the subsequent migration patterns of those
cultures throughout the continent (Elazar, 1966). Within the
southern states the dominant political culture is identified as
"traditional"; it grew out of a conservative, plantation-centered
agricultural system. This culture tends to perpetuate the
dominance of an elite-oriented political order, and political
leaders play conservative and custodial rather than initiatory
roles (Elazar, 1966, pp. 79-116). In contrast the upper Midwest
is dominated by a "moralistic" political culture in which "both
the general public and the politicians conceive of politics as a
public activity.. .properly devoted to the advancement of the
public interests" (Elazar, 1966, p. 90).
Although the mobility of our citizens has undoubtedly led to
the erosion and displacement of dominant political cultures in
every state in recent years, there is no doubt that generally
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota have a different approach to
politics than do Virginia, Arkansas, and Florida. Despite the
steady flow of Northeasterners into South Florida and the move-
ment of "hillbillies" into Southern Michigan, these two states
are vastly different in their politics. Although one might find
it impossible to precisely calculate the effects of differences
in political cultures on policy outcomes, one could get a rough
idea of those differences by examining a limited number of common
policies in each state and/or region.
The political culture in Florida is still predominantly
"traditional", and was not conducive to a liberal reform effort
in the late 1970's. As evidence of the conservative political
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climate, one could cite the failure of the legislature to pass
the Equal Rights Amendment, the overwhelming rejection by voters
of a referendum to allow casino gambling, the rejection of a gay
rights ordinance in Miami (one of the state's most liberal
communities), and the continued use of capital punishment.
Advocacy Strategies for Unpopular Causes in a Traditional
Political Culture
Reformers interested in liberalizing social policies in a
state should consider how other relevant social issues have been
resolved before developing a strategy for reform. Such issues
might include state legislative action concerning the Equal
Rights Amendment, the legal rights of homosexuals, the
incarceration of juvenile and adult offenders, and the provision
of services to disadvantaged, handicapped, and minority groups.
Public opinion polls are also very useful in determining whether
the right climate for policy reform is present.
If the policy in question is one which is likely to en-
counter opposition from a dominant political elite because of a
clash in values, then it is obviously in the reformers' best
interests to avoid raising a question of values (or program/
policy objectives) if at all possible. A reform of a state's
juvenile detention criteria could be pressed on the basis of its
practicality (allowing intake workers to be shifted to
supervising probationers) or cost-efficiency (cutting perhaps by
one-half the number of youths detained in a regional facility at
$35.00 each per day).
Avoiding publicity and media coverage is also a wise stra-
tegy if the policy change raises questions which could push
policy-makers into a position of opposing the change. The new
detention criteria would probably have encountered less criti-
cism if it had not been for the widespread coverage in the press.
As indicated earlier, most of this coverage was biased and
one-sided, giving the citizens an impression that "juvenile
killers" were being whimsically turned loose on the community.
Members of the reform coalition even held meetings with edi-
torial boards throughout the state in an attempt to obtain fair
and accurate reporting of the consequences of the revised code.
Unfortunately, it is easier to sell newspapers with headlines
such as "Who Protects Us? Asks Mother of Raped Son" than with
editorials noting the success of the new policy in reducing
costs, increasing individual liberties, maintaining a low "no-
show" rate for court appearances, etc.
Where a great potential for value conflict exists, re-
formers should consider the possibility of a policy change
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through bureaucratic rather than legislative means. This tech-
nique is particularly appealing if there is an enlightened
professional bureaucracy which exercises discretion in the
administration of the policy. Unfortunately, such a bureaucracy
seems less likely to be found in states with a traditional
political culture. Even in the deep South, however, one
occasionally finds small enclaves of professional social workers
within a large unprofessional bureaucracy. If the values of
these small groups of professionals are congruent with the reform
efforts, than perhaps a bureaucratic manipulation of the policy
is possible.
A closely related strategy is possible whenever policy
decisions are highly decentralized. For example if each county
is responsible for developing and enforcing criteria for juvenile
detention, one might attempt to locate a progressive county in
which officials could be persuaded to consider a policy change.
By working closely with local officials and making every attempt
to insure the success of the reform effort at that level (along
with fair and accurate reporting in the local press), an appeal
could be made later to other counties, using the first county as
a model for policy change.
If all attempts to reform policy fail using concilliatory
methods such as these, reformers can fall back on the possi-
bility of accomplishing change through adversarial means such as
litigation. Such efforts have been more-or-less successful in
states like Texas (Morales vs. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (1973))
and Alabama (Pugh vs. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (1976)), especially
in the area of correctional policy.
Strategies involving cooperation and public education are
still in order, of course, in those situations in which a strong
conflict of values between reformers and decision-makers is not
likely to occur. The methods outlined above may be of more use
in a traditional political culture such as Florida has, especial-
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